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Executive Summary 
 
The application of quota management techniques from Canada’s supply management 
sector to a domestic emissions permit trading system is highly feasible and attractive.  
These two types of economic instruments are highly similar, and the lessons learned from 
managing quotas can be used with great profit to guide the design and implementation of 
a domestic emissions permit trading regime.  In fact, there are few key characteristics of 
an efficient emissions permit trading system that has not been used or developed in the 
supply management regime.  Put differently, despite apparent differences, the two 
systems are close analogs of each other.  Even though quotas are focused on outputs and 
emissions permits on inputs, both cases involve an action that generates net income to the 
recipient or provides restricted access to something that is valuable.  Quotas allow access 
to a market with a more profitable (higher) milk price.  Emissions permits allow firms 
who produce greenhouse gases a potentially cheaper way to deal with them using the 
permit rather than following a potentially more expensive process of actually reducing 
their emissions. 
 
There are key elements of such a system.  First of all, it is most important to allow 
permits to trade among users with as few restrictions and as simple an administration as 
possible.  If so, the initial allocation is not important as far as its efficiency is involved.  
The trading should embrace a geographic area that is broad and an openness to many 
traders.  Monitoring of actual emissions and adequate enforcement is also critical.  Plans 
for reducing permitted emissions over time are important and models for doing this are at 
hand in the supply management system. 
 
It is also true that the supply management regimes illustrate potential pitfalls in an 
emissions permit trading system.  The key lessons would be the following.  First, quota 
systems can be run efficiently and with little difficulty, but they must be kept as simple as 
possible.  One must not try to burden the allocation and transfer system with more 
objectives than the restriction that is intended.  The result of trying to do many things in 
such a system is a growing number of regulations, the result of which is to make more 
difficult and reduce the prevalence of quota transfers.  It thus adds a variety of economic 
costs, many of which are imposed on farm producers, and makes the system less efficient 
in terms of the allocation of output. 
 
A second lesson is that it is possible to design and operate a quota/permit system that 
both works efficiently, through relatively unrestricted and open quota transfers, and can 
generate any income transfers that one might wish, through the initial quota allocation.  
The ease with which such a system can meet both political and economic objectives is 
welcome but uncommon across the range of policy instruments. 
   4
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In response to the Kyoto Accord on limiting greenhouse gases, there has been 
considerable interest across countries in using quantitative limitations on these gases as a 
policy instrument.  Further, the idea of allowing these quantitative limits or permits to 
trade among firms or enterprises that are releasing these gases to the atmosphere has 
attracted a great deal of attention.  This is due particularly to the efficiencies that would 
be generated by such a process whereby the firms with the most efficient, low cost, or 
effective production processes in terms of their GHG emissions, those that can most 
easily and efficiently meet their existing GHG limits, would have the greatest incentive to 
purchase and utilize these permits.  This type of instrument might be considered to fall 
within a category of “economic” instruments in that it has value to its holder and lends 
itself to being traded within a market; indeed there are efficiency gains to allowing such a 
market to exist and operate freely. 
 
If an emissions trading regime is to be considered for application to Canada, the issue of 
managing such a system comes quickly into question.  There are many issues that arise in 
terms of system management, from stakeholders wondering how they would be treated to 
public officials concerned about how they will deal with the variety of contentious 
subjects known to arise, like initial and ongoing allocations of permits, how to allow 
transfers to take place, and what restrictions will be necessary to make this “market” 
work well.   
 
There is one very rich source of information about how to manage such a system 
efficiently, drawn from at least 30 years of experience in managing Canada’s agricultural 
supply management quotas.  There are very close parallels between running a system for 
emissions trading and running supply management quotas.  Few questions or problems 
that may be expected to arise in an emissions trading system have not been experienced 
or dealt with in some part of the complex supply management regime.  It is the purpose 
of this paper to describe Canada’s supply management quota system and draw out the 
important lessons that have been learned of relevance to managing an emissions trading 
system. 
 
There are five topic areas that we will cover.  First, by way of introducing the supply 
management quota systems, we will cover the two general types of quotas that are 
required to manage the system.  Second, the roles of different levels of government will 
be reviewed.  When appropriate, the different commodity schemes covered by supply 
management will be examined because the different commodities covered under supply 
management have quite different circumstances, resulting in rules and procedures that are 
sometimes quite different.  Third, the subject of quota allocation will be covered, 
covering both initial allocations as well as subsequent or ongoing quota allocations, as 
well as issues of enforcement and monitoring of the quota limitation.  Fourth, we will 
review quota transferability.  This subject is at the heart of an efficient and effective 
quota system.  The issues that are covered here include the different types of exchange 
systems used, problems with the size of quota trading jurisdictions and farms wishing to   5
exit or enter, as well as the capitalization of the benefits of the quota into its price.  
Finally, the lessons learned from the supply management system that are most relevant 
for an emissions permit trading system will be reviewed.   
 
 
II.  Brief Background to Supply Management and its Two Quota Types 
  
The supply management sector in Canada covers two major agricultural industries, the 
dairy and poultry industries.  These two sectors together are a substantial economic 
entity—they account for 20 percent of total sales at the farm level in Canadian 
agriculture.  The critical characteristic of this sector for this study is that it is highly 
regulated through a particular type of marketing board.  The marketing boards involved 
in supply management have considerably larger and more significant powers than do 
regular or “non-supply management” marketing boards.  Specifically, they have the 
power collectively to restrict imports into the country, the power to control domestic 
supply through limitations on what farmers and provinces can produce or market, and as 
a result they can set the domestic price for their commodity.  Other marketing boards can 
do many things in the marketing of a product, but they do not have these three powers. 
 
To implement these two types of restrictions the supply management marketing boards 
use two different quota types.  One is a farm-level quota that limits how much of a 
farmer’s output can be marketed.  This quota is defined in terms of a specified number of 
units of production than can be sold each year into the domestic market.  Therefore, it is 
unlike a license (e.g., a taxicab license) where the license (taxi medallion) is needed to 
engage in the industry but the output level (number of fares) is variable and left up to the 
firm concerned.  Given this quantitative nature of the farm quota, there is a desire on the 
part of farmers to buy and sell these quotas, if only to allow farms to expand or contract 
the size of their enterprise.  In most (provincial) jurisdictions, the regulations governing 
these quotas now allow farm quotas to be bought and sold, particularly in the dairy 
industry.  Another important characteristic of these farm quotas is that there is usually no 
time period attached to them.  They can be considered to “last” an indefinite period of 
time into the future, subject to the farmer meeting certain conditions.  Finally, these 
quotas are formally owned and largely managed by the provincial marketing boards. 
 
The other quota type is an import quota that provides a quantitative limit on import 
access across the different final consumer products within the dairy and poultry 
industries.  Such quotas have existed and been administered since the introduction of 
supply management regimes in the early 1970s.  Since the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture came into effect in 1995, these quotas have become part of the agricultural 
trade regulatory “infrastructure” and are now referred to as “tariff rate quotas” (TRQs), or 
simply “tariff quotas.”  Like farm quotas, they also specify a certain quantity of imports 
that are allowed.  They are different from farm quotas in that they are allotted annually, 
not permanently.  In other words, there is legally no guarantee that next year’s allotments 
will be allocated to this year’s quota holders.  But, in fact, for most quota holders, getting 
their import quota allotment renewed or re-allocated in subsequent years is quite likely.  
These quotas are managed by the federal Department of Foreign Affairs and International   6




Because these two quota types encompass a range of quota types, rules, and regulations 
they present two useful points of comparison in designing a system of tradable domestic 
emissions permits.  This is all the more so when one considers that the essential elements 
of a domestic emissions permit trading system are the same as the key elements of the 
two quota systems about to be reviewed in more detail.  In terms of coverage in this 
paper, we will describe the farm level quotas in somewhat more detail due to the greater 
complexity of those quotas. 
 
 
III.  The Role of Different Levels of Government 
 
A.  Farm Marketing Quotas 
Government arrangements for these quotas are complex and they differ across 
commodities.  A familiar theme in the case of farm marketing quotas is that jurisdiction is 
shared between federal and provincial governments, making federal-provincial 




The federal government role differs by commodity and is often tied up with these federal-
provincial committees.  In the poultry industry, federal government involvement comes 
through an oversight council, the National Farm Products Council, whose mandate is to 
assist producer groups in the formation of “agencies” to engage in collective action to 
market farm products, including authority over inter-provincial and export marketing, and 
to supervise such agencies that have formed.  Of course, the federal government was 
instrumental in earlier years in the policy design of supply management regimes by 
setting out the legislative framework to permit what are known as “orderly marketing” 
schemes.  This is the legislation under which the National Farm Products Council 
operates.  Two examples of national agencies in the poultry industry are the Canadian 
Egg Marketing Agency (CEMA) and the Canadian Chicken Marketing Agency (CCMA).    
 
Following a somewhat different model, the federal government also plays an important 
role in the dairy industry.  In this case it is through a designated federal agency, the 
Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC).  This agency is more directly involved in dairy 
industry policies and their implementation than in the case of the poultry industry model 
outlined above.  It recommends milk production targets, operates an offer-to-purchase 
price support scheme that underwrites industrial milk prices across the country, 
administers inter-provincial agreements to pool sales revenues, operates storage 
                                                 
1 These import quotas are effectively enforced through “over-quota” tariffs that are large enough to make 
imports above the TRQ uneconomic.  The effect of these tariffs when coupled with the inability to use 
export subsidies is to keep domestic within-quota production at the level of domestic consumption. 
2 Part of the reason for this is to make legal the restrictions on inter-provincial trade inherent in a supply 
management regime.  Another reason is that import restrictions under the GATT were considered 
acceptable if there was in place a cross-province agreement to limit domestic production (Article 11).     7
programs, and generally coordinates the implementation of the National Milk Marketing 
Plan.  Most of these functions impinge directly or indirectly on decisions regarding farm 
quotas. 
 
However, the federal government is also involved with the provinces in the important 
Canadian Milk Supply Management Committee (CMSMC).  This federal-provincial 
committee makes the important decisions on how much milk should be produced and 
how it should be allocated across provinces.   
 
The provincial governments are involved in supply management regimes, and quota 
decisions, through the provincial marketing boards.  Provincial boards are party to a 
variety of national decisions through the federal-provincial committees just discussed, 
such as in the case of aggregate milk quota levels through the Canadian Milk Supply 
Management Committee.  But they are more singularly involved in the implementation of 
national rules and decisions within each province.  These boards are usually run relatively 
independently of provincial governments, but the provinces can often influence board 
decisions by their power to appoint, or replace, board members. 
 
1.  Dairy Industry Details  
The role of different government levels in the dairy industry can be illustrated by the 
sequence of decisions that are made in the normal implementation of farm level quotas.   
This process begins with the farm and processor price for milk, which is determined by a 
federal government policy decision for both prices.  Then, given these milk prices, the 
quantity demanded for all milk products is estimated by the CDC, and aggregated to the 
total domestic supply of milk needed, which is a critical data input provided to the 
CMSMC.  The federal-provincial CMSMC makes the final decision on total domestic 
milk supply needed.  It also decides upon the allocation of this total to each province, 
determining its total provincial quota.  The basis for this provincial allocation decision is 
usually made with reference to its historical allotment.  In other words, national increases 
or decreases in quota are usually translated into corresponding provincial allotment 
increases or decreases.
3  Then, the last step in determining farmers’ individual quotas is 
for the provincial marketing board to take its provincial allotment and determine the 
allocation to individual farmers.  This process is also usually based on historical 
allotments held by individual farmers, just as it is at the provincial level described above.
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2.  Poultry Industry Details 
In the poultry industry, there is a roughly similar allocation of responsibilities as in dairy, 
described above.  There is, however, a less direct role of the federal government in the 
national poultry agencies.  In this industry, it is the national agencies that estimate 
                                                 
3 There are a small number of exceptions to this process, where there has been a decision to make a 
different allocation to a particular province on the basis of case-specific circumstances. 
4 There is another distinction in the dairy industry between the federal and provincial governments and that 
concerns the fluid milk industry.  The preceding discussion applies to the industrial milk component of the 
dairy industry while the fluid milk component is regulated by provincial governments.  This includes 
decisions on pricing, quotas to cover the production of fluid milk, and any associated regulations.   
Although there were reasons for making the provinces responsible for the administration of this portion of 
the milk industry it has added to the complexity of the overall milk industry and its management.    8
national demand for their products, hence national quota levels, and allocations for inter-
provincial trade and exports.  Farm level pricing is done by the national agencies, at least 
in terms of establishing target ranges for prices.  In some cases, provincial boards make 
adjustments to that price in their province (for example, some chicken boards establish a 
minimum farm price within their province).  The national agencies, in some cases, also 
run national quota exchanges, and sometimes undertake national licensing of farm 
producers.  The provincial poultry boards also do largely what provincial milk boards do.  
They usually allocate provincial quota to producers, and put forward detailed rules to 
govern its allocation, trade, and general administration. 
 
Provincial boards, for both industries, often add many other regulations than those that 
pertain directly to quota allocation and trading as described above.  In fact, it can be said 
in general that boards often practice quite heavy levels of micro-management.  Some 
examples of these other regulations include the mandatory licensing of all producers,
5 
setting of minimum and maximum levels of quota holding at the farm level (i.e., size of 
enterprise), pooling of receipts across products, sales, and time periods, setting of a 
system of monetary levies and taxes for various circumstances, plus in-kind levies on 
farmers’ quotas, regulating procedures for export selling, and the establishment of quota 
reserves for managing the quota system and to fund special programs such as for new 
entrants.   
 
B.  Role of Different Government Levels in Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) 
It is relatively straightforward to describe the role of different levels of government in the 
administration of Canada’s supply management import quotas, or TRQs.  They are 
managed by the federal Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) 
in accordance with Canada’s commitments made in the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement 
on Agriculture.  The specific agency within DFAIT that administers these quotas is the 
Export and Import Controls Bureau.  There is some communication between DFAIT and 
the national agency involved in that commodity in terms of certain elements of 
administration.  There is no provincial or local government involvement with these 
quotas; jurisdiction for all elements of international trade falls to the federal government. 
 
Summary Details of TRQ Administration 
Most of the regulations and procedures for obtaining and using the quotas are the same 
with TRQs as they were for import quotas prior to 1995.  The level of these quotas is 
embedded in Canada’s UR commitments.  The role of DFAIT is to allocate them to 
individual firms and set up, or maintain, the rules by which they are administered.  Most 
of the TRQ allocations are received by private firms.  There is one post-1995 exception 
and that is for butter where the CDC is the sole importer.    
 
                                                 
5 This licensing involves quite tight control of who can own quota.  In particular, boards usually require 
that only those involved in the production process can own the quota.  This restricts considerably one’s 
ability to rent quota and makes complete rental of one’s quota impossible.  This required linkage of asset 
ownership to the production process is not common in other industries.  It reduces the efficiency of capital 
markets in such industries and introduces a barrier to entry to new farmers who do not have large amounts 
of capital.   9
The allocation procedures vary by commodity, especially varying by whether there has 
been increases or decreases in demand for the commodity in question.  Mostly, they 
emphasize historical importers and firms with established operations and distribution 
lines.  Sometimes allocations are proportional to production or sales, and sometimes an 
allocation depends upon specific component needs in the production process.  In other 
cases, TRQs are allocated on a first come, first served basis.  There are sometimes 
options for new firms to apply for import quota.  Almost always there is an adjustment 
for any previous quota left unfilled.  “Use it or lose it” is the rule almost universally 
applied, with an allowance for sufficient prior notification to the administering agency.  
There are some size restrictions per company for TRQ holding allowed, and some 
Canadian residency conditions.  No financial element is involved in the quota allocation 
process between quota recipients and the administering agency.  That is, there is no 
auctioning and no charge for a quota allocation.  Therefore, all quota rents accrue to the 
quota recipient.  Some commodity rules still do not allow rentals or inter-firm quota 
transfers, but in most cases, these TRQs can be rented and sold. 
 
 
IV.  Quota Allocation to Individual Farms 
 
To some, this aspect of a quota management system is the most important.  In terms of 
the economics, it is important but the transfer arrangements are arguably more important.  
However, in terms of the politics of a quota system, the income or distributional changes 
occasioned by the quota system, quota allocations are centrally important.  We begin by 
noting that there are two dimensions to quota allocation, (a) the initial allocation, and (b) 
any changes in farm allocations for individual or system-wide reasons. 
 
1.  Initial Allocation 
Farm Quotas 
Most of the supply management initial quota allocations occurred in the early 1970s, 
when these marketing regimes were being established.  Quotas were distributed gratis to 
farm producers who were already in the industry at that time, and based on historical 
patterns of farm production.  So the quantity of quota allocated was usually in proportion 
to farm production levels on each farm, using a distribution rule such as if a farm 
accounted for x percent of provincial production prior to the introduction of the supply 
management regime, that farm would also receive x percent of the provincial quota to be 
allocated.  This would result in some reduction in production for farm recipients if the 
introduction of the supply management regime required some aggregate industry-wide 
cutback in production, as occurred in some cases.  In others, the quota allotment was set 
equal to some previous years’ average production level. 
 
Import Quotas (TRQs) 
As noted earlier, import quotas or TRQs in Canada are annual quotas, so each year there 
is a new “initial” allocation.  This allocation is also a gratis allocation, as in the case of 
the farm quotas.  Also, like the farm quotas, import quotas have typically been allocated 
to historical holders.  But the federal government bureau that allocates TRQs makes it 
very clear that it makes no legal commitment to renew allocations to existing holders   10
each year.  In the case of some commodities, there are certain groups that are given a 
higher priority in TRQ allocations, depending on their commitments to serve the industry 
or some other characteristic judged to be important.  For example, firms or industry 
groups that sometimes are given priority in TRQ allocations would be firms that require a 
certain (supply managed) input in their manufacturing process or have a certain 
distribution activity, or further processors that must buy domestic raw materials at higher 
prices than in the US but must also meet U.S. competition in their output without import 
protection (e.g., in chicken).
6  Another allocation method for TRQs that is not uncommon 
is “first come, first served.”   
 
Other options 
There are other allocation rules or mechanisms that could have been used, for either farm 
quotas or TRQs.  One allocation mechanism commonly recommended, and discussed 
earlier for import quotas, is an auction, although it is rarely used to allocate import quotas 
in practice.  To my knowledge, auctions have never been used for initial supply 
management farm quota allocations.  In very few cases, bids are taken for increases in 
quota allocations, but this is a recent development.  The attractions of using auctions are 
that the system is open, prices are transparent, and the quota rents (the profits derived 
from the quota) accrue to the government.  Of course, the latter point is also the main 
reason why auctions are not common, even for new allocations:  existing quota holders 
strongly lobby government to allow them to keep what they see as “their” rents. 
 
There are as many other allocation options as there is imagination to devise new ways of 
distributing quotas.  This can be seen in the case of TRQs.  To give quota to firms that 
can be seen to deserve it opens up the door for almost any initial allocation.  However, as 
will be seen in the next section, if there is a well-developed opportunity to trade quotas 
broadly and with few restrictions, an ultimately efficient allocation of quota can arise 
from any initial distribution.   
 
2.  New Quota Allocations 
It is not uncommon in some commodities, at least for some time periods, for new quota to 
be added to the system (national aggregate quota).
7  The most common reason is an 
increase in aggregate demand, a situation that has been most common in the chicken or 
broiler sector.  When there is such growth in consumption, new quota would be added at 
the national level, which is in turn allocated to provinces, and lastly to individual farms. 
 
The mechanism for allocating this new quota to provinces has usually been a pro rata 
(equal percentage) increase.  However, on occasion there have been special arrangements 
for certain provinces due to prior negotiated agreement.
8  The mechanism for allocating 
                                                 
6 This is the situation for processors which produce higher value-added products such as chicken pot pies  
and frozen pizzas where their competitiveness with US processors is otherwise impaired from having to 
pay more than their US competitors for the raw chicken or milk inputs. 
7 This is not an issue for import quotas because those quotas are set and allocated annually anyway. 
8 One such example is a different mechanism for allocating industrial milk quota to British Columbia.  
These special arrangements have arisen to deal with regional differences in economic growth and 
competitiveness at the farm level.  They have also become necessary due to the restrictions on   11
new quota to individual farms has been very similar to that for provinces.  The most 
common allocation has usually been a pro rata increase, but sometimes there are special 
provisions for certain groups.  For example, there are some cases where a specified 
amount of new quota is withheld first for a new entrant pool, then the balance of the new 
quota is allocated on a pro rata basis. 
 
There is a modified and more sophisticated model for new quota allocation when demand 
for the product is growing that has been applied in some provinces in the chicken sector.  
Quota here is defined into different categories, primary and secondary.  Primary quota is 
the “permanent” or “base” quota, and secondary quota is considered to be temporary.  
When there is an increase in demand, but one that is not (yet) known to be permanent, 
secondary quota is increased accordingly.  However, once that increase in demand is 
judged to be permanent, then the secondary or temporary quota is rolled into the primary 
category to become part of the permanent or base quota.  This approach handles market 
growth well, especially when there is uncertainty in the short run about whether an 
increase in consumption is permanent or temporary.  This method allows producers to 
share in any temporary market growth with an increase in production and quota, but they 
share also in the risk that this consumption, and the associated quota, may not be 
permanent.   
 
3.  Quota Reductions 
Another market situation that must be dealt with is a reduction in demand that occurs 
from time to time in a variety of markets and occurs more systematically in some.  It so 
happens that one of the supply management commodities is an example of the latter, and 
that is eggs.  Consumption has trended downward for most of the past 15 or so years.  In 
a market situation like this, the supply management regime must subtract quota from the 
national system over time.   
 
This example is particularly relevant to an emissions permit trading system where 
allowable emissions are most likely to be declining over time.  This will be necessary to 
deal with Kyoto targets in the 2008-2012 period.  Further, following the procedures 
described in the second paragraph below, using a base quota plus an annually announced 
utilization rate, will have the effect of reducing the uncertainty faced by firms that hold 
emissions permits.  Permit holders may not know in advance exactly the size of the 
reduction in allowed emissions, but they will be prepared for some pattern of reduction, 
and the permit market will reflect this expectation.  A related point is that the government 
unit managing these permits should design and operate the permit trading system with the 
objective of keeping this uncertainty to a minimum. 
 
The simplest way to deal with it is to follow similar rules to additions to aggregate quota.  
Pro rata reductions in quota to provinces, and then to producers, will accomplish the 
needed reduction in production in a clear and effective manner.  It is also relatively more 
equitable for small farms than a fixed reduction in quota per farm, regardless of size.  As 
in the case of additions to the aggregate quota stock, there are some cases of special prior 
                                                                                                                                                 
interprovincial transfers of quota.  More flexibility in system design in terms of allowing interprovincial 
trade in quotas would have made unnecessary any special arrangements for certain provinces.   12
arrangements for quota reductions, whether it applies to provincial agreements or targeted 
groups of individual farmers.   
 
A more sophisticated model can be used in cases of systematic quota reductions, like has 
been experienced in the egg industry.  Here, we begin with the concepts of Base quota 
and some utilization rate each year.  Provinces and individual farmers will have some 
base quota, but there will also be some percentage utilization rate announced each year 
which would usually be a level less than 100 percent for such markets.  To illustrate, one 
year the utilization rate might be 90 percent, the next year only 88 percent, and so on.  
This has the substantial advantage that producers will always be aware that they will not 
be able to utilize fully their base quota, and they may well anticipate a decrease in 
utilization each year.  Having a system that institutionalizes and makes more certain to all 
producers the otherwise uncertain and painful process of reductions in quota is an 
important advantage.  Quota markets also accommodate ongoing quota reductions by 
building this information into revenue predictions and quota prices.   
 
Enforcement of quota limits 
A topic that is particularly important for managing quota systems that often gets assumed 
away or ignored is the ability to enforce the production or marketing limitations imposed 
by the quota.  This is another reason to build into the system a method for changing, 
specifically reducing, quota allocations at the farm level--to provide for an enforcement 
mechanism to minimize over- and under-production relative to the quota allocation.  
Typically, enforcement is done by imposing a schedule of levies facing farms, in terms of 
quota cutbacks and/or monetary penalties, that apply if farms produce more than their 
quota.  The penalty often is large enough to lower the net price facing farmers to the U.S. 
price, the world price, or a lower price.  The schedule of overproduction fines can be non-
linear, increasing with the degree of overproduction.   
 
If the farm fails to utilize its quota, the penalties that are usually applied are in terms of 
quota reductions (the “use it or lose it” provisions), although these tend to be less onerous 
than overproduction penalties.  For example, some flexibility is usually allowed so only 
underproduction below 90 percent of the quota is usually penalized.  Furthermore, some 
temporal flexibility or grace period is usually allowed, depending on the situation and the 
commodity.  Quota cutback provisions may only apply in a second year of underuse.
9 
 
Enforcement measures assume that marketing levels by farm can be monitored.  This is 
often taken for granted, but is sometimes relevant in supply management and may be 
relevant also for emissions permits.  Some creative solutions have been explored in the 
supply management area to deal with cases where there can be difficulties in output 
monitoring.  For example, in the poultry sector other quotas have sometimes been used.  
In addition to an egg quota, hen quotas have been added.  Another alternative is to add a 
quota on the square feet of facilities.  These are viable options due to the nearly fixed 
                                                 
9 Quota acquired by a Board through such penalties usually goes into a “quota reserve” which is used for 
various purposes including ad hoc reallocations, a source of supply for special programs (e.g., new 
entrants), or “financing” over-quota production at the provincial level.   13
proportions between hen numbers and square feet of space in the technology of 
producing eggs.  Both alternatives are highly correlated with the actual output level. 
 
External and Internal Pressures on Quota Allocations 
It is to be expected that there will be internal pressures by the domestic stakeholders of 
the supply management system to have an allocation system that allows them to keep the 
quota rents or advantages provided by the system.  The stakeholders referred to would be 
primarily the farmers, but also marketing board and national agency members, with 
processors having a secondary level of influence.  In the case of TRQs, the stakeholders 
would be the importers, but in some cases also certain processors and distributors.  The 
current systems, whether for farm quotas or TRQs, show the results of these internal 
pressures, with provincial differences in regulations and procedures often showing which 
groups are the most powerful stakeholders. 
 
In terms of external pressures there appear to be few.  Trade obligations, of course, 
determine tariff and total TRQ levels, and apply to any measure that would be judged to 
be an export subsidy.  However they do not apply to the provincial or firm-level 
allocation of either farm quotas or TRQs.   
 
Evaluating Alternative Allocations 
Within the supply management regime, including both farm and import quotas, there are 
many alternative quota allocation rules and allocations themselves that have been 
proposed and actually used.  Auctions are often touted as the preferred method of quota 
allocation.  However, unless one wishes that all the quota rents accrue to the government, 
other methods of allocation can be similarly as efficient.  The key element of an 
economically efficient quota system is to have the lowest cost firms doing the production 
and this situation is facilitated by an open, transparent and easy-to-use quota market that 
permits low cost transferability.
10  So with sufficient ease of transfer built into the quota 
system, there is little reason on the basis of efficiency or resource allocation to oppose or 
support one allocation mechanism against another. 
 
 
V.  Quota Transferability 
 
Easy transferability of quota, or an open, transparent and low cost quota market, is a 
critical element of a well-functioning quota regime, particularly in terms of the 
economics of the system.  Not only does transferability increase the flexibility of the 
system to quota or permit holders, but allowing a market in this economic instrument has 
the great advantage of providing prices on the quota or permit that gives important 
signals to quota/permit holders about their value.  This will allow the instrument to be 
                                                 
10 Another important feature of a well functioning quota market is sufficient liquidity, an issue that arises in 
cases of “thin” quota markets.  Greater liquidity may be facilitated by quota auctions when combined with 
an in-kind quota transfer tax and an auctioning off of the quota reserves so acquired by the Board.  If 
liquidity is a major concern, the Board can go so far as to “tax” every quota-holder each year (or other time 
period) some amount of his or her previously held quota (not just when quota is transferred), and then 
auction off that quota.   14
allocated to those firms who make the best use of them.  It is also particularly important 
for system managers to realize that a well-functioning market in these quotas minimizes 
the need for bureaucratic allocation devices or interventions.
11   
 
There are different ways in which quota can be transferred.  An important distinction is 
between the sale or purchase of quota and quota rental arrangements.  The purchase and 
sale of quota is a relatively permanent or long term transaction, whereas quota rental is 
temporary, usually only for a year or less.  Both kinds of transfers have important 
advantages to farmer or importers, and in an ideal world, both types of transfer would be 
allowed and occur side by side, just like we see in most real estate and many equipment 
markets, for example. 
 
The Canadian supply management system has shifted increasingly over the years since its 
inception to allowing quota to be transferable among farmers, mostly via the permanent 
purchase and sale of the asset.  Rentals of quota are most commonly prohibited, for 
reasons that are not always obvious.  But changes are occurring here too, in the direction 
of some rentals being allowed, such as through a swap arrangements that in effect mimic 
a rental transaction. 
 
Quota market mechanisms 
The most common means of farm quota transfer is through formal quota exchanges, 
usually run by the marketing board.  Farmers submit bids to buy and offers to sell, and 
the marketing board matches them to find the market-clearing price.  All transfers for that 
iteration on the exchange then change hands at that price.  Usually these exchanges 
operate once a month.  This means there is no opportunity to change one’s bid or offer 
until the next month.  The results of these exchanges are usually published by some 
means.  Typically two types of transfers, whole farm transfers and sales to relatives, are 
not required to use the quota exchange. 
 
The quota market takes on different forms in some jurisdictions.  Some marketing boards 
allow or have allowed quota transfers to be done through private quota brokers or through 
other private means (advertising in trade magazines and newspapers).  In other cases, 
quota changes hands on an informal basis but through the marketing board.  In almost all 
cases, whatever the means of exchange, a transfer of quota requires some kind of Board 
approval.  And there are still some Boards that do not permit the quota to be exchanged 
or traded independently of the farm itself (i.e., the quota is tied to land and buildings).  
Finally, in a few cases, some Boards still attempt to prevent quota from taking on a value, 
particularly when the quota is tied to farm premises.  However, such vain efforts are quite 
uncommon now after other jurisdictions that previously attempted to eliminate quota 
values found that the task was close to impossible.  A great deal of regulatory effort and 
accountants’ costs can be spent doing this, and the gains are marginal.  If Boards wish to 
                                                 
11 One important lesson from supply management quota administrations is the need to avoid the temptation 
to over-regulate quota markets, such as adding new objectives for the system to meet.  One example is that 
some Boards have tried to use quota market regulations to hide the quota value.  This serious mistake has 
meant more difficult transferability and a less efficient distribution of the quota among producers, in 
addition to reducing farmers’ flexibility in adjusting their output level to changing economic circumstances.   15
remove some or all of the capital gains from quota transfers, they could simply tax the 
quota transfer in some way or even auction it.   
 
Quota Transfer Regulations 
Even with the operation of these quota exchanges, there are still many other provincial 
marketing board regulations on quota transfers, some of which are relatively benign, but 
others that have some economic effect, usually an economic cost.  Almost all Boards 
require Board approval of a transfer.  Transfer fees, mentioned above as a possibility, are 
in fact common.  They are usually an in-kind tax (x units of quota or y percentage of the 
units transferred) with the quota amounts taxed payable to the Board.  In some provinces 
for some commodities, quota cannot be transferred from one region to other regions 
within the province.  Most Boards do not permit quota from within that province to be 
transferred to out-of-province farms.
12  Recently some quota within provinces has been 
designated “federal” quota, which has the distinction it can be traded interprovincially, 
but this is still a relatively small proportion of provincial quota. 
 
Problem of Thin Quota Markets 
Another issue concerning quota transfers and quota markets is whether these markets are 
large, or small and illiquid (thin).  This can be an issue in some jurisdictions, more often 
in the poultry industry than in dairy due to the smaller producer base in poultry.  One way 
of solving this problem is to move to larger quota trading jurisdictions, such as from 
several provinces, each with small quota markets, to one regional quota market, such as 
one for Western Canada, Eastern Canada, or even one national market.  This idea, 
allowing a multi-province quota market, has been widely discussed in the dairy industry, 
and has gone as far as a limited common market for quota among several eastern 
provinces.  Such moves have tended to be opposed by some processors and provincial 
governments who see a potential loss of commodity (e.g., milk) sales, economic activity 
and jobs in those regions that have less of a comparative advantage in that commodity, 
even though there would be net gains to the common trading region as a whole.   
 
Another way of dealing with illiquid quota markets was mentioned above in footnote 6.  
There can be an in-kind tax on quota transfers where the quota flows to a Board operated 
reserve, and that reserve or part of it can be sold periodically, typically auctioned, to 
increase the amount of quota available on the market for purchase. 
 
Entry into and Exit from the industry 
Supply management systems are often criticized for inflexibility, and one example of 
such a criticism applies to new entrants.  With all the restrictions on quota transfers in 
some industries, do quota systems prevent new lower cost or more efficient entrants from 
entering the industry?  This is a potentially valid concern, but it is valid only when quota 
transferability is heavily restricted.  If quota transfers are sufficiently unrestricted and 
                                                 
12 One reason for interprovincial or interregional transfer restrictions is to introduce a form of protection for 
processing plants in that jurisdiction.  Similarly, some Boards try to regulate the amount of milk allocated 
to each processing plants, also a form of protection for plants.  In both cases, market allocation mechanisms 
exist, are feasible, and are superior in arriving at a low cost and efficient distribution of production among 
farmers and processing among milk plants.     16
accessible, any newcomer can enter the industry, with one proviso, that the person can 
finance the quota purchase.  Quota transferability also encourages the less efficient 
farmers to leave the industry.  They can see the market value of quota and the quota price 
will most likely exceed what it is worth to the high cost quota owner.  Such a sale would 
have the added benefit of leaving the less efficient farmer with a considerable “pension” 
from the sale of the quota.  In fact, the track record of these supply managed industries in 
terms of exits and new entrants supports these arguments.  The rate of exit from these 
industries is at least as high as for non-supply managed farms. 
 
A related argument that is relevant to quota transferability is the question of whether 
quota systems prevent an efficient allocation of quota across farmers and regions.  This is 
partly a question of entry and exit.  If quota transfers are left as open as possible, it 
encourages the high cost farmers to leave and it opens the door to new farmers who 
believe they are more efficient to enter, encouraging what is sometimes referred to as 
“structural adjustment” within the industry.  This issue of whether quota systems are 
inefficient also depends on the free movement of quota across regions.  If quota is easily 
transferable between regions, quota will shift toward lower cost or higher revenue 
regions, generating the economy-wide benefits of exploiting regions’ comparative 
advantage.  So quota systems can work efficiently with open quota transferability, given 
the inherent costs of these scheme in restricting production and limiting imports. 
 
High quota values 
One criticism of Canada’s supply management quota regime is that it results in very high 
quota values.  It is well-known that the high rents generated by increased domestic farm 
product prices are capitalized into high quota values.  The argument is true—the cost of 
quota in the dairy industry now is in the range of $20,000 per cow in a number of 
provinces, making the cost of purchasing enough quota for a 100-cow farm would be $2 
million.  This cost becomes explicit when quotas are traded openly.  This valuation of 
quota is also unavoidable, despite the efforts of some Boards to mask this value, as 
discussed earlier.  It can be expected whenever the license or permit allows a firm to 
increase its revenues or decrease its costs, and it should be expected in a domestic 
emissions permit trading system as much as it is found in the supply management sector.   
 
These high quota values also have two effects.  First, such values will have the result of 
limiting the number of people who can enter the industry due to the inability of some 
individuals to raise the large sums of capital needed.  However, observations from the 
supply managed sector show that there still seem to be plenty of people who can raise the 
necessary funds.  Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, once farmers have invested in 
such assets, any kind of political change or reform of the quota system is made more 
difficult politically, due to strong opposition to moves that would result in declines in 
farm asset values. 
 
This discussion indicates the importance of a quota transfer system that is flexible, 
accessible to all, and as unrestricted as possible.  This means few restrictions on the types 
of entrants, existing farmers can buy or sell quota readily, quota also can be rented in or   17
rented out easily, and quota is allowed to move to and from any regions of the country.  If 
so designed, farmers benefit, new entrants benefit, and the economy benefits.   
 
 
VI.  Conclusions:  What Lessons for Emissions Permit Trading? 
 
There are several lessons from Canada’s supply management sector that are relevant to 
an emissions permit trading regime.  First, quota systems can be run efficiently and with 
little difficulty, but they must be kept as simple as possible.  One must not try to burden 
the allocation and transfer system with more objectives than the restriction that is 
intended.  The result of trying to do many things in such a system is a growing number of 
regulations, the result of which is to make more difficult and reduce the prevalence of 
quota transfers.  It thus adds a variety of economic costs, many of which are imposed on 
farm producers, and makes the system less efficient in terms of the allocation of output. 
 
A second lesson is that it is possible to design and operate a quota/permit system that 
both works efficiently, through relatively unrestricted and open quota transfers, and can 
generate any income transfers that one might wish, through the initial quota allocation.  
The ease with which such a system can meet both political and economic objectives is 
welcome but uncommon across the range of policy instruments. 
 
Third, supply management quotas are very relevant for emissions permit trading despite 
some apparent differences.  Even though quotas are focused on outputs and emissions 
permits on inputs, both cases involve an action that generates net income to the recipient.  
In a general way, quotas and emissions permit both provide restricted access to 
something that is valuable.  Quotas allow access to a market with a more profitable 
(higher) milk price.  Emissions permits allow firms who produce greenhouse gases a 
potentially cheaper way to deal with them using the permit rather than following a 
potentially more expensive process of actually reducing their emissions. 
 
Trade in quotas results in the farms that have the lowest cost, hence the most profitable 
farms, being able to pay the most for their quota, hence holding more quota and 
accounting for a larger share of industry production.  Trade in emissions permits will 
result in firms who are low-cost in terms of their marginal abatement costs wanting to sell 
their allotted permits and expand production, paying out the (low) cost to reduce their 
emissions to live within their permitted emission level.  Firms that have high marginal 
abatement costs will find it to their advantage to buy emissions permits rather than abate 
their GHG emissions, and possibly reduce output.  The result will be that the firms with 
the lowest abatement costs will be using those methods to reduce their emission and 
expanding production, and enjoying the revenue from selling their permits.  Firms with 
higher abatement costs will be buying permits instead of reducing their emissions, and 
cutting back their production.  The net result will be a reduction in total emissions with 
the most efficient firms in terms of abatement costs doing most of the cutting back in 
emissions and increasing their share of production in that industry.  An active trade in 
these permits will allow these environmentally desirable processes to take place and to do 
so in an economically efficient manner.   18
 
Some may argue that emissions permits are more short run than supply management 
quotas, but there are many similarities.  Farm quotas are treated by farmers as if they are 
risky assets or as if they have a short time horizon.  Import quotas (TRQs) look like they 
are very short term (one year) assets, like an annual emissions permit, but in fact they are 
treated like they are a much longer-lived asset than one year.  And emissions permits will 
be known to continue into the future, albeit at levels that are not known with certainty.  
Therefore they will occupy a very similar role in the hands of the producer, being a long-
lived asset but with short term uncertainty as to their actual level.  Finally, there might 
appear to be a difference between the two assets, quotas and emission permits, because 
allowed emission levels are likely to fluctuate yet supply management quotas are fixed.  
However, a permit trading system can deal with periodic fluctuations by using the 
concepts of a base quota or permit and an annual, changeable utilization rate, a regime 
that is used extensively in some supply management quota systems (e.g., eggs). 
 
Fourth, there are many details or features that can be recommended for emissions permits 
as well as for quotas.   
(a)  Their purchase or sale should be allowed for long term adjustments, 
and short term rentals should be allowed to deal with annual 
fluctuations.  The experience of farm quota systems give guidance to 
the former while the TRQ system gives guidance to the latter.   
(b)  Impose a minimum number of restrictions on these trades and on 
potential traders, and keep the trading area within which permits can 
be traded as large as is administratively possible. 
(c)  Ensure accurate monitoring of emissions and adequate enforcement 
measures.  For emissions permits or quotas, this is critical to a well-
functioning system and the challenges in doing so should not be 
underestimated.   
(d)  Virtually any kind of initial permit allocation is compatible with a 
successful permit system. 
(e)  Provisions for adding new permits or, most likely, making permit 
reductions, must be drawn up, and there are several models from the 
poultry sector of how to handle each of these two situations well.  
Defining a base emissions level and a “utilization rate” is likely to be a 
sound basis for emissions permits where allowable emissions are 
likely to decline over time. 
(f)  Auctions for permit allocations have some advantages that are worth 
looking at, but they are not essential.   
(g)  It may be necessary to take measures to ensure adequate liquidity in 
the traded permit market, and there are some guides to this from 
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